Transcript: Simon Duke on Now That Saddam's Gone - What Next? | Oct 19, 2003

Simon Duke stands on a small stage, behind a wooden lectern with a logo made of a blue four-pointed star and a red maple leaf.
Simon is in his forties, clean-shaven, with short blond hair. He's wearing glasses, a gray suit, white shirt, and striped red tie.

A caption appears on screen. It reads "Simon Duke. European Institute of Public Administration. Maastricht, The Netherlands. Fissures in the Atlantic or in Europe? The Atlantic Council of Canada Annual Spring Conference, May 21, 2003."

Simon says NOW THE TITLE
I'VE BEEN GIVEN IS FISSURES IN
THE ATLANTIC OR IN EUROPE, AND
I'D LIKE TO START OUT BY SAYING
QUITE CLEARLY
THAT I DON'T THINK IT'S AN
EITHER-OR BECAUSE THERE ARE
OBVIOUSLY FISSURES IN BOTH.
AND FOLLOWING THE LAST SPEAKER'S
REMARKS, I WOULD LIKE TO
CONCENTRATE ON THE EUROPEAN
PROSPECTUS AND THEN TURN TO
CONSIDER SOME OF THE
TRANSATLANTIC IMPLICATIONS.
NOW, I'VE IDENTIFIED THREE
PRINCIPAL FISSURES THAT I WANT
TO THINK ABOUT THIS MORNING.
THE FIRST ARE THE FISSURES
BETWEEN THE E.U. MEMBER STATES.
AND HISTORICALLY, THIS IS TENDED
TO DIVIDE THE MEMBER STATES
ALONG WHAT ARE CALLED ATLANTISTS
AND EUROPEAN LINES.
THE SECOND FISSURE IS THAT
BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE
ACCESSION COUNTRIES AND THE
CANDIDATES.
AND THE FINAL ONE IS THE
FISSURES IN TRANSATLANTIC
RELATIONS AND WITH OTHER
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS NATO AND
THE UNITED NATIONS.
NOW LET ME SAY BY WAY OF
INTRODUCTION TO THESE FISSURE-
THEMES, THAT I DON'T THINK THE
IRAQ CRISIS HAS ACTUALLY CAUSED
THESE FISSURES.
IT HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN A CATALYST
AND HAS GIVEN STOP RELIEF TO
MANY OF THE FISSURES THAT I
THINK WERE ALREADY UNDERLYING
EUROPEAN COOPERATION, OR LACK
THEREOF, IN A WIDE ARRAY OF
EXTERNAL RELATIONS TOPICS.
IT'S ALSO EVIDENT THAT THE IRAQ
CRISIS CAME AT A VERY AWKWARD
TIME FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION.
I THINK AS MANY OF YOU KNOW, WE
HAVE EMBARKED UPON AN EXTENSIVE
RE-THINK OF HOW THE EUROPEAN
INSTITUTIONS SHOULD LOOK, TO
PREPARE FOR ENLARGEMENT IN MAY
OF NEXT YEAR, WHEN THE E.U. WILL
EXPAND FROM 15 TO 25 MEMBER
STATES.
WE WERE PREPARING, AS THE PHRASE
GOES, FOR
INSTITUTIONAL
FINALITE OF THE UNION.
NOW THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY
ACCOMPANIED BY A GOOD DEAL OF
WIDER THINKING ABOUT THE
EUROPEAN UNION'S ROLE IN THE
WORLD.
INDEED EXTERNAL RELATIONS HAS
BEEN ONE OF THE CENTRAL TOPICS
IN THIS CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE
OF THE E.U.
SO IT'S NATURALLY SOMEWHAT
EMBARRASSING TO HAVE THE GAP
BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY
EXPOSED RATHER DRAMATICALLY BY
THIS CRISIS.
I AM HOWEVER, AND THIS MAY BE A
LITTLE BIT SURPRISING, RATHER
OPTIMISTIC THAT MOST OF THE
FISSURES I'VE DESCRIBED CAN BE
OVERCOME AND I THINK ON THE
WHOLE, THE IRAQ CRISIS MAY PROVE
TO BE A RATHER HELPFUL THING IN
THE LONGER TERM FOR BOTH THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND FOR
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS.
LET ME COMMENCE THEN WITH SOME
CONSIDERATION OF THE FIRST
FISSURE THAT I MENTIONED IN
RELATION TO THE IRAQ CRISIS.
THAT IS THE FISSURES BETWEEN THE
MEMBER STATES.
THE OBVIOUS PROBLEM IN THIS
REGARD IS WHY THE E.U. MEMBER
STATES FAILED TO WORK TOGETHER
AND WHY THEY FAILED TO WORK
THROUGH THE COMMON INSTITUTIONS
AND MECHANISMS THAT THEY
THEMSELVES HAD ESTABLISHED.
FOR THE STUDENTS PRESENT WHO MAY
NOT KNOW THIS, IT'S PERHAPS
NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN BRIEFLY
THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL
COMPONENTS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION.
THAT IS THE OLD COMMUNITY WHICH
USED TO BE CALLED THE "EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY" WHICH
BASICALLY ALLOWS THE MEMBER
STATES TO CEDE SOVEREIGNTY IN
CERTAIN AREAS TO THE COMMUNITY
WHICH ACTS ON THEIR BEHALF, AND
THIS LEADS TO THE SO CALLED
A QUI COMMUNAUTAIRE.
HOWEVER, EXTERNAL RELATIONS ARE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL.
THE SO-CALLED COMMON FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY RELIES UPON
REACHING CONSENSUS BETWEEN THE
MEMBERS.
IT IS PART OF THE UNION BUT IT
IS DISTINCT IN MANY WAYS FROM
THE COMMUNITY WHICH MEANS THAT
THERE ARE NO LEGAL MECHANISMS TO
FORCE THE MEMBER STATES TO WORK
THROUGH THE COMMON FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY.
AND THIS INDEED PROVED TO BE THE
FIRST REAL PROBLEM THAT THE E.U.
FACED.
THE MEMBER STATES SIMPLY
DISREGARDED, BY AND LARGE, THEIR
TREATY-BASED COMMITMENTS TO WORK
THROUGH THE COMMON FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY, AND TO SUPPORT
IT IN THE SPIRIT OF MUTUAL
SOLIDARITY AND LOYALTY.
THIS IS INDEED A PATTERN THAT
YOU CAN FIND, NOT JUST IN THE
IRAQ CRISIS, BUT OTHER CRISES IN
RECENT YEARS IN THE BALKANS
WHERE BY AND LARGE THE COMMON
FOREIGN SECURITY POLICY WAS PUT
TO THE SIDE IN FAVOUR OF VARIOUS
AD HOC COOPERATION MECHANISMS,
SUCH AS THE SIX MEMBER CONTACT
GROUP.
THE FINGER IS OFTEN POINTED AT
FRANCE AND GERMANY AS BEING THE
CHIEF CULPRITS FOR SIDELINING
THE E.U. AND THE WHOLE RESPONSE
TO THE IRAQ CRISIS.
HOWEVER, I THINK TO BE FAIR,
THAT BLAIR'S ROLE WAS HARDLY
HONOURABLE IN THIS REGARD EITHER
SINCE THE U.K. REACHED ITS
NATIONAL POSITION VERY QUICKLY,
CONSULTED WITH ALLIES IN
WASHINGTON, ARE ALL WORKING
AROUND THE COMMON FOREIGN
SECURITY POLICY, AND IN
PARTICULAR, THE HIGH
REPRESENTATIVE FOR C.F.S.P.,
JAVIER SOLANA.
THE SMALLER MEMBER STATES FELT
THAT THEY WERE NOT ADEQUATELY
CONSULTED BY THE LARGER MEMBER
STATES.
AND THEY WERE DENIED THE CHANCE
TO REALLY REACH A CONSENSUAL
POSITION,
IF
ONE WAS
POSSIBLE ON THIS PARTICULAR
CRISIS.
NOW MY ARGUMENT IS NOT THAT HAD
THEY WORKED THROUGH THE E.U.
MECHANISMS, IT WOULD HAVE
NECESSARILY CHANGED THE OUTCOME,
BUT NEVERTHELESS, THE
OPPORTUNITY TO REACH CONSENSUS
IN THE FIRST PLACE
THROUGH
THE E.U.
MECHANISMS WOULD HAVE GREATLY
STRENGTHENED THE COMMON FOREIGN
AND SECURITY POLICY.
THIS MAY APPEAR TO BE A VERY
DAMNING INDICTMENT OF THE COMMON
FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY.
INDEED, SOME SEE IT AS A VIRTUAL
END OF THE COMMON FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY.
AS THE ADAGE GOES, "THERE'S NO
COMMON.
THERE'S NO SECURITY.
THERE'S NO POLICY.
IT'S ALL FOREIGN."

[Chuckles from audience]

Simon continues HOWEVER I THINK THIS IS A RATHER
DANGEROUS PERSPECTIVE BECAUSE IT
INDUCES A CERTAIN KIND OF MYOPIA
BY MAKING THE IRAQ CRISIS
EQUITABLE WITH THE FUTURE OF THE
COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY
POLICY.
AND IT'S WORTH POINTING OUT THAT
DURING
THE IRAQ CRISIS,
A NUMBER OF QUITE SIGNIFICANT,
FOR US, DEVELOPMENTS TOOK PLACE
THAT GIVE ME ROOM FOR SOME
OPTIMISM ABOUT THE E.U.'S FUTURE
ROLE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND
CONFLICT PREVENTION.
TWO THINGS ARE WORTH MENTIONING
VERY BRIEFLY.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IN JANUARY
OF THIS YEAR, THE E.U. TOOK OVER
A U.N. PEACE MISSION IN BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA.
AND IN THE SECOND PLACE, IN
MARCH OF THIS YEAR, THE E.U.
ASSUMED THE OLD NATO DUTIES IN
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF
MACEDONIA IN OPERATION
CONCORDIA, RUN IN CLOSE
COLLABORATION WITH NATO.
IT'S ALSO WORTH NOTING THAT THE
COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY
POLICY IS
NOT
E.U.
EXTERNAL RELATIONS.
THERE ARE MANY OTHER AREAS DEALT
WITH BY THE COMMUNITY SUCH AS
TRADE, AID AND DEVELOPMENT TO
THIRD PARTIES, AND ALTHOUGH
THERE ARE PROBLEMS IN THIS AREA,
BY AND LARGE IT WORKS VERY WELL
AND GIVES THE E.U. A VISIBLE
ROLE ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE.
AND THE COMMON FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY IS OBVIOUSLY AN
IMPORTANT PART OF FRAMING THE
E.U.'S INTERNATIONAL ROLE.
AND IF WE REACH THE CONCLUSION
THAT C.F.S.P. IS AL BUT DEAD, WE
DAMAGE E.U. EXTERNAL RELATIONS
IN GENERAL.
LET ME TURN NOW TO THE FISSURES
BETWEEN THE ACCESSION COUNTRIES
AND THE CANDIDATES THAT WERE
EXPOSED AS A RESULT OF THIS
CRISIS.
OF ALL THE FISSURES THAT ARE
DEVELOPED, THIS I THINK WAS THE
MOST NEEDLESS AND COULD HAVE
BEEN AVOIDED.
THE CATALYST FOR THESE FISSURES
WERE SOME REMARKS MADE BY
PRESIDENT CHEVAK IN MID-FEBRUARY
THAT, TO MY MIND, CAN ONLY BE
DESCRIBED AS EXTRAORDINARY.
IT WAS AN OUTBURST WHERE HE
DESCRIBED THE ACCESSION
COUNTRIES AND THE CANDIDATES AS
"BADLY BROUGHT UP CHILDREN" WITH
A CLEAR MESSAGES THAT HE
EXPECTED, ON ISSUES SUCH AS
THIS, THEY SHOULD FALL IN LINE
AS PREDOMINANTLY SMALLER MEMBER
STATES WHO WISH TO JOIN THE
EUROPEAN UNION SOON.
AND THIS HAS OPENED UP A VERY
INTERESTING DEBATE IN THE E.U.
ABOUT WHETHER ENLARGEMENT OF THE
E.U. IS GOING TO DECISIVELY
CHANGE THE NATURE OF E.U.'S
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, IN
PARTICULAR, THE COMMON FOREIGN
AND SECURITY POLICY.
THE POINT IS OFTEN MADE THAT THE
E.U. IN THIS AREA IS SOON GOING
TO BE ATLANTICIZED WITH THE
ACCESSION OF FIRM PRO-
ATLANTICIST SUPPORTERS.
BUT THIS IS A CURIOUS CONCERN
FOR TWO REASONS I THINK.
THE FIRST IS THAT THE E.U. IS
ALREADY ATLANTICIZED.
THERE HAVE BEEN HISTORIC
SUPPORTERS OF A STRONG NATO ROLE
AND A STRONG INVOLVEMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA IN E.U.
EXTERNAL RELATIONS.
AND IN PARTICULAR, THE U.K. IS
MENTIONED IN THIS REGARD, BUT
THERE ARE OTHERS AS WELL, SUCH
AS THE NETHERLANDS, SPAIN AND
PORTUGAL.
THE SECOND REASON WHY IT'S A
CURIOUS OBSERVATION THAT THIS IS
GOING TO CHANGE THE EUROPEAN
UNION, IS THAT IT ASSUMES THERE
IS AN INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN
BEING GOOD EUROPEANS AND
SUPPORTING AN ACTIVE ROLE FOR
THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN
EUROPEAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS.
INDEED, THE HISTORY THAT THE
ACCESSION COUNTRIES BRING TO THE
EUROPEAN UNION MEANS THAT THEY
DO NOT HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THIS
APPARENT DICHOTOMY.
THERE IS NO PROBLEM IN BEING A
GOOD EUROPEAN AND AN ACTIVE
SUPPORTER OF THE ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE.
POLAND IS AN OBVIOUS EXAMPLE OF
THIS.
SO I'M HOPING THAT THESE LARGELY
AVOIDABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
THE ACCESSION COUNTRIES, THE
CANDIDATES AND THE MEMBER
STATES, CAN BE ADDRESSED VERY
SOON IN A CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER
BECAUSE IT IS TOO LATE TO STOP
ENLARGEMENT.
IT IS A PROCESS THAT IS GOING
AHEAD VERY QUICKLY.
THE REFERENDUM ON THE PART OF
THE ACCESSION COUNTRIES, I THINK
FOUR HAVE TAKEN PLACE ALREADY,
SIX HAVE TO GO.
AND IT'S UNLIKELY THAT THERE
WILL BE ANY MEMBER STATE WHO
WILL SAY NO.
THEN LASTLY, PERHAPS THE MOST
SERIOUS FISSURES, ARE THOSE THAT
HAVE EMERGED IN TRANSATLANTIC
RELATIONS AND RELATIONS WITH
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS.
TO START OFF WITH, I THINK THAT
OUR THINKING ON TRANSATLANTIC
RELATIONS HAS BEEN
OVERSIMPLIFIED, AND IN THIS
REGARD I WOULD DISAGREE SLIGHTLY
WITH THE PREVIOUS SPEAKER
BECAUSE I THINK KAGANS ARE
THOUGHTS WHICH ARE IMMENSELY
POPULAR IN EUROPE, AS THEY ARE
IN NORTH AMERICA, ARE VERY
ENTERTAINING AND MAKE A
WONDERFUL READ.
BUT HOWEVER THEY LEAD TO RATHER
CRUDE STEREOTYPES AND IF YOU DO
A READ WITH A VENUS AND MARS
ANALOGY, IT WAS JAVIER SOLANO
WHO REMINDED US THAT THE
OFFSPRING OF VENUS AND MARS, WAS
OF COURSE, HARMONIA.
[Light chuckles from audience]
I PREFER A MORE COMPLICATED
PICTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC
RELATIONS BECAUSE THERE ARE
HAWKS TO BE FOUND IN EUROPE,
JUST AS THERE ARE DOVES IN THE
U.S. CONGRESS.
I DO HOWEVER AGREE WITH THE
OBSERVATION THAT WE, IN EUROPE,
PERHAPS DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE
FULL IMPACT OF 9-11 ON AMERICAN
THINKING AND SECURITY
PERSPECTIVES.
IT WAS A TRAUMATIC EVENT THAT WE
OBVIOUSLY WATCHED WITH HORROR
AND CONCERN OURSELVES, AND THE
SUPPORT THAT WAS SHOWN BY THE
EUROPEAN UNION, ARE FOR THE
UNITED STATES, AND THE IMMEDIATE
AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS WAS
GENUINE AND SINCERE.
HOWEVER, I THINK IT'S WORTH
NOTING, THAT THE U.S. NEEDS TO
UNDERSTAND
OUR
PREOCCUPATIONS WITH OUR
TRAUMATIC EVENT.
AND OF COURSE, OUR EVENT, WHICH
SHAPES OUR THINKING AND THE
SHAPE OF EUROPE TODAY, WAS
NOVEMBER 1989.
THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL AND
THE RESHAPING, THAT'S STILL
GOING ON OFF EUROPE.
THIS DOESN'T MEAN THAT THERE ARE
INCOMPATIBILITIES IN THE AGENDAS
BUT MERELY THAT WE NEED AN
ENHANCED DIALOGUE TO UNDERSTAND
OUR CONCERNS AND OUR
PERSPECTIVES ON A VARIETY OF
THINGS BUT CHIEFLY GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE.
THE SECOND IMPORTANT POINT I
THINK WHEN IT COMES TO THINKING
THROUGH THE DIFFERENCES THAT
HAVE BECOME EVIDENT IN
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IS ITS
ENCOURAGED A VIEW IN WASHINGTON
THAT THE EUROPEAN UNION,
PARTICULARLY IN THE COMMON
FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, IS
SOMEWHAT INEPT AND LARGELY TO BE
IGNORED BECAUSE THE U.S. CAN
CHERRY PICK AMONGST THE E.U.
MEMBER STATES TO GET WHAT THEY
WANT IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS.
THIS MAY HOWEVER BECOME MORE
DIFFICULT FAIRLY SOON.
AND THE REASON I SUGGEST THIS IS
BECAUSE THERE ARE A NUMBER OF
ITEMS THAT ARE COMING UP ONTO
THE TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA WHERE
THERE IS FAR MORE EUROPEAN
SOLIDARITY IN OUTLOOK, AND THESE
INVOLVE QUESTIONS SUCH AS THE
ROADMAP ON THE MIDDLE EAST,
QUESTIONS OF THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ISSUES.
IT MAY BE THEREFORE, RATHER MORE
DIFFICULT FOR THE U.S. TO CHERRY
PICK IN THE FUTURE, PARTICULARLY
ON THESE ISSUES.
AND THAT MEANS THAT THE U.S. HAS
TO BEGIN TO ACCEPT THE EUROPEAN
UNION AS A SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL
ACTOR, AND ONE THAT HAS TO BE
ADDRESSED AS AN EQUAL.
AND THIS MEANS ALSO THAT WE HAVE
TO ADDRESS OUR DIFFERENCES
BECAUSE WE DO SEE THE WORLD
DIFFERENTLY AROUND US, BUT WE
ALSO HAVE COMMONALITIES.
AS LONG AS THIS IS NOT A
DIALOGUE OF EQUALS, IT'S GOING
TO BE VERY DIFFICULT TO REACH
UNDERSTAND.
THIS ALSO MEANS THAT WITHIN THE
E.U., WE HAVE TO BE VERY CLEAR
ABOUT WHAT THE OBJECTIVES ARE OF
THE UNION, PARTICULARLY IN
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, TO AVOID
GIVING THE IMPRESSION IN
WASHINGTON THAT THE EUROPEAN
UNION IS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE
UNITED STATES, AND NOT A
VALUABLE PARTNER.
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ALSO
OBVIOUSLY CONCERNS THE WHOLE
ROLE OF NATO
DIFFERENTLY AROUND US, BUT WE
ALSO HAVE COMMONALITIES.
AS LONG AS THIS IS NOT A
DIALOGUE OF EQUALS, IT'S GOING
TO BE VERY DIFFICULT TO REACH
UNDERSTAND.
THIS ALSO MEANS THAT WITHIN THE
E.U., WE HAVE TO BE VERY CLEAR
ABOUT WHAT THE OBJECTIVES ARE OF
THE UNION, PARTICULARLY IN
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, TO AVOID
GIVING THE IMPRESSION IN
WASHINGTON THAT THE EUROPEAN
UNION IS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE
UNITED STATES, AND NOT A
VALUABLE PARTNER.
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ALSO
OBVIOUSLY CONCERNS THE WHOLE
ROLE OF NATO
THERE ARE A VARIETY OF DIFFERENT
PERSPECTIVES IN EUROPE ABOUT THE
UTILITY OF NATO
SOME SAY IT STANDS FOR "NO
ACTION TALK ONLY."
HOWEVER, IT IS AN INSTITUTION
THAT IS NOT IN OPPOSITION TO, OR
COMPETITION WITH THE EUROPEAN
UNION.
IT'S OFTEN PORTRAYED AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO THE EUROPEAN
SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY NT A
COMPLEMENT TO IT.
NOW I REJECT THIS VIEW AND I
THINK THE E.U. IN NATO ARE
EMERGING AS VERY VALUABLE
PARTNERS.
THERE HAVE BEEN A VARIETY OF
INITIATIVES RECENTLY, INCLUDING
NUMEROUS MEETINGS AT PARALLEL
LEVELS, BETWEEN THE CIVILIAN AND
MILITARY COMPONENTS OF NATO AND
EUROPEAN UNION.
THERE IS AN AGREEMENT ON EXHANCE
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
BETWEEN THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS.
THEY HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT AS
WELL ON A NUMBER OF TECHNICAL
ISSUES.
AND, I THINK VERY IMPORTANTLY,
WE HAVE SEEN ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT
OF THE NATO AND THE E.U. IN THE
BALKANS.
AND INDEED IN OPERATION
CONCORDIA AS I MENTIONED A
MOMENT AGO, NATO IS ACTIVELY
SUPPORTING THE EUROPEAN UNION IN
ITS ENDEAVOURS THERE.
SO THE MESSAGE IN THIS REGARD
WOULD BE THAT COMPLEMENTARITY IS
THE MESSAGE OF THE DAY.
THE E.U. AND NATO NEED EACH
OTHER.
AND WE ALSO NEED EACH OTHER FOR
TWO ADDITIONAL REASONS.
ONE, IS THAT NATO HAS FIRMLY
GONE OUT OF AREA.
NATO IS INVOLVED IN AFGHANISTAN
AND NATO MAY SOON BE INVOLVED IN
IRAQ AS WELL.
THERE IS A VERY COMPLEX DEBATE
WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION ABOUT
THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF OUR
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND
PARTICULARLY, THE SCOPE OF OUR
RAPID REACTION FORCE.
THIS IS CLOAKED IN AMBIGUITY AS
TO WHETHER WE ARE ESSENTIALLY
BUILDING A REGIONAL FORCE OR
WHETHER THIS FORCE MAYBE
DEPLOYABLE INTERNATIONALLY.
THERE IS NOT AGREEMENT ON THIS.
SO HAVING NATO CARRYING OUT SOME
INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS, AND THE
E.U. ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR MORE LOCAL MISSIONS, MAY
MAKE A SENSIBLE DIVISION OF
LABOUR, AT LEAST FOR MEDIAN
TERM.
THE SECOND REASON FOR SUGGESTING
THAT THERE IS COMPLIMENTARILY
BETWEEN THE E.U. AND NATO LIES
IN THE DUAL ENLARGEMENT.
THE E.U. WILL EXPAND IN MAY
2004, WE HOPE, AND BY A
REMARKABLE COINCIDENCE, SO WILL
NATO, EXPANDING FROM 19 TO 26.
THE E.U. MEANWHILE WILL EXPAND
TO 25.
THIS MEANS THE COMMON MEMBERSHIP
OF THE TWO INSTITUTIONS WILL GO
UP FROM 11 TO 20.
AND IT'S VERY MUCH PART OF THE
HOPE OF THE ACCESSION COUNTRIES
TO THE E.U. AND NATO THAT THERE
WILL BE COMPLIMENTARILY BETWEEN
THESE ORGANIZATIONS AND THEY CAN
GO ON WORKING TOGETHER.
NOW I'VE OBVIOUSLY AVOIDED A
VERY DIFFICULT PART OF THIS
PRESENTATION.
THAT'S THE WHAT'S NEXT QUESTION.
I HAVE A FEW IDEAS AND THEY ARE
TENTATIVE.
AND THE IDEAS ARE DRAWN IN PART
FROM A NUMBER OF TRANSATLANTIC
DECLARATIONS THAT SEEM TO HAVE
BEEN MULTIPLYING IN RECENT DAYS.
ONE CAME OUT LAST WEEK FROM
THE CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES , AND
THERE'S ALSO ANOTHER VERY
PERCEPTIVE ONE FROM THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
AND
THE CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN
REFORM IN LONDON .
AND I WOULD AGREE WITH SOME OF
THEIR OBSERVATIONS.
FIRSTLY ON IRAQ, IT'S CLEAR THAT
THERE HAS TO BE A BROAD
UNDERSTANDING ON IRAQ WITH
EXCEPTIONS ON THE PART OF THE
U.S. OF A NEED FOR A BROAD
BARGAIN ON IRAQ, WHICH SHOULD
INCLUDE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT FOR A
PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
THE CHALLENGE FOR EUROPE IS TO
BE OVERCOMING OUR OBJECTIONS TO
THE WAR.
AND THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS AND
THE LEGALITIES OF THE WAR SHOULD
CERTAINLY BE DEBATED BUT IN A
PROPER CONTEXT.
AND WE SHOULD SHOW OUR
WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE IF
CALLED UPON TO A NATO
PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
THE SECOND AREA WHERE
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS COULD BE
BUILT UPON IS IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ROADMAP ON
THE MIDDLE EAST.
THIS IS CLEARLY A PRIORITY, FROM
THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE.
ALTHOUGH THERE ARE WELL
PUBLICIZED DIFFERENCES AND
PERSPECTIVE WITHIN THE QUARTET.
IT IS NEVERTHELESS ESSENTIAL TO
STICK TO THE ROADMAP AND BUILD
ON COMMON CONCERNS IN THE REGION
THAT UNITE US, STEMMING FORM THE
ONGOING ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
PROBLEM, SUCH AS BROADER
CONCERNS ABOUT THE FIGHT AGAINST
TERRORISM, AND THE PROLIFERATION
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
THIRD, THERE IS A NEED FOR
DIALOGUE ON IRAN.
IN THIS REGARD, THE E.U. HAS A
VERY VALUABLE ROLE TO PLAY AND
IT'S ONE WHERE THE U.S. COULD
ACCEPT, MORE EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP
AND THE E.U. FOR ITS PAST PART,
MUST INSIST ON IRAN'S OBSERVANCE
OF THE BASIC CONDITIONS FOR
STABILITY IN THE REGION,
PARTICULARLY THE NON-
PROLIFERATION MEASURES.
NEXT, THERE IS A NEED TO BUILD
UPON THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
E.U. AND THE U.S. ON OUR COMMON
CONCERNS ABOUT TERRORISM.
SINCE 9-11, THERE HAVE BEEN VERY
HEALTHY SIGNS OF COLLABORATION
ACROSS THE ATLANTIC.
AN ACTIVE EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION THROUGH EURO-JUST
AND EURO-POLL.
THIS IS SOMETHING THAT
NEVERTHELESS NEEDS TO BE
ENHANCED AND WE WILL HAVE SOME
DIFFICULT AGENDA ITEMS TO
DISCUSS AND ADDRESS, SUCH AS
PRIVACY.
AND LASTLY, I THINK WE NEED TO
BUILD UPON OUR COMMON CONCERNS
ABOUT WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION.
AND THIS IS CERTAINLY SOMETHING
THAT IS RECEIVING HEIGHTENED
AWARENESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION.
THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL MAJOR
ADDRESSES MADE BY JAVIER SOLANO,
THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE, FOR THE
COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY
POLICY RECENTLY.
THIS WILL REQUIRE ADJUSTMENT
FROM AL SIDES.
IT WILL PROD THE UNITED STATES
TO SEE THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A
PARTNER IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS.
AND IT WILL REQUIRE THE E.U. TO
PERSUADE THE UNITED STATES THAT
IT IS A CONSTRUCTIVE PARTNER AND
IT IS NOT TRYING TO EMERGE AS A
COMPETITOR TO THE UNITED STATES.
WE NEED EACH OTHER AND
PARTNERSHIP IS CLEARLY THE ROAD AHEAD.

[Applause]

Simon leaves the lectern and a man walks up to the microphone. The man is in his sixties, bald and clean-shaven. He's wearing glasses, a gray suit, white shirt, and checked gray tie.

He says Sir.

A man from the audience rises and stands at a microphone. He's in his fifties, wearing a green military uniform.

He says LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN BLACKSON FROM THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY.
Dr. DUKE THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR
A VERY INTERESTING PRESENTATION.
I WANT TO CHALLENGE PERHAPS YOUR
OPTIMISM, IT STRUCK ME THAT YOUR
COMMENTS ABOUT ROBERT KAGAN'S
THESIS IS VERY INTERESTING AND
IT ECHOED IN MY MIND A THOUGHT
OF Dr. HUNTINGTON AND HIS THESIS
ON THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS,
WHICH PEOPLE HAVE PANNED, ACROSS
THE BOARD IN MANY COUNTRIES AND
YET THERE'S A CERTAIN TRACTION,
A CERTAIN TRUISM TO WHAT HE HAS
TO SAY THAT ECHOES TODAY AND HAS
A CERTAIN CREDIBILITY IN IT AND
IT GELS IN CERTAIN PEOPLE'S
MINDS.
IT STRIKES ME ALSO THAT ROBERT
KAGAN'S THESIS ALSO HAS A
CERTAIN TRUISM TO IT.
THAT AS MUCH AS YOU CAN FIND
HOLES IN THE THEORY, IT HAS
TRACTION IN REALITY THAT MAKES
PEOPLEELIEVE IT TO A CERTAIN
POINT.
AND THAT THEN LEADS ME TO MY
OBSERVATIONS, YOUR COMMENTS
ABOUT THE FUTURE AND WHERE WE'RE
HEADING WITH THE EAST YORK
PALESTINE.
INTERNATIONAL TRANSATLANTIC
ISSUES THAT LEAD ME TO BE NOT
NEARLY AS OPTIMISTIC AS YOU
ABOUT WHERE WE'RE HEADING AND
WHAT THAT MEANS FOR FUTURE
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND THE
PLACE OF E.U. AND THE ROLE OF
NATO
PARTICULARLY ALSO WHEN YOU THINK
ABOUT THE EASTERN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES THAT ARE JOINING NATO
AND THE E.U.
THE TENSIONS THAT WE HEARD ABOUT
IN THE PREVIOUS PRESENTATION.
I'M JUST RUNNING IF YOU'D LIKE
TO COMMENT ABOUT THOSE
OBSERVATIONS, PLEASE.
THANK YOU.

Simon says THANK YOU.
IT'S A REAL SHOPPING BASKET OF
POINTS.
THEY'RE AWESOME UNDERLYING, I
THINK INTERESTING POINTS AND
SOME TRUTHS TO KAGAN'S THESIS OF
COURSE.
BUT I THINK MY UNDERLYING POINT
WAS THAT IF WE TRADE IN
STEREOTYPES THEN WE'RE NOT GOING
TO PROGRESS ON OUR COMMON
CONCERNS AND AGENDAS, AND MY
FEAR IS THAT KAGAN HELPS TO
PERPETUATE STEREOTYPES.
THEY ARE EXTREMELY INTERESTING
BUT I'M NOT SURE THAT THEY'RE
THAT HELPFUL TO A CONSTRUCTIVE
DIALOGUE AT THE MOMENT.
THERE IS SOME TRUTH THAT EUROPE
DOES THINK THAT IT'S LIVING IN A
POST MODERN PARADISE.
BUT I DON'T THINK IT'S TRUE THAT
THE E.U. IN PARTICULAR HAS
AVOIDED OR DUCKED THE SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS.
THERE ARE ALL THESE PROBLEMS
THOUGH IN ADDRESSING THE
SECURITY CHALLENGES THAT WE
FACE.
THERE ARE OBVIOUS SHORT COMINGS
AS WELL.
THE MOST OBVIOUS ONE TO MY MIND
IS THE E.U., HAS TALKED THE
TALK, BUT HAS YET TO REALLY WALK
THE WALK.
WE HAVE MADE ALL THE GREAT
DECORATIONS, THAT'S THE EASY
PART.
THE INSTITUTIONS BY AND LARGE
HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED AND ARE
WORKING.
WHAT IS NOT THERE IS THE
POLITICAL WILL FROM THE MEMBER
STATES TO REALLY FLUSH OUT, OUR
ABILITIES TO BE AN ACTIVE,
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PARTNER.
THIS IS THE BIG CHALLENGE AS I
SEE IT FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND A POTENTIAL QUOZE OF
PESSIMISM RATHER THAN OPTIMISM.
IF THE MEMBER STATES SIMPLY
FIGHT TO DELIVER ON THEIR
PROMISES AND TO MAKE THE
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE
POLICY IN PARTICULAR A REALITY,
THEN WE WILL BE CONSTRAINED IN
OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THAT
WOULD INCLUDE INFLUENCE
TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA.
AN IN THAT REGARD, I AM VERY
CONCERNED THAT THERE IS VERY
LITTLE EVIDENCE IN THE E.U.
MEMBER STATES OF A SIGNIFICANT
INCREASE IN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE
FOR EXAMPLE, WITH ONE OR TWO
EXCEPTIONS.
AND WE HAVE TO FACE THE
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF NOT
DOING THAT.
AND I DON'T SEE AN ACTIVE
DEBATEON THAT IN THE E.U. AT THE
MOMENT.
AS FOR THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE
E.U. AND THE ACCESSION
COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THE
CANDIDATES, YES THERE ARE
DIFFERENCES OF OPINION, AND I
THINK THIS IS A LEARNING PROCESS
FOR THE E.U. ITSELF.
TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THEIR
PERCEPTIONS ARE OF THE WORLD
AROUND THEM.
AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR HISTORY.
THERE ARE CERTAIN EXAMPLES WHEN
INDIVIDUAL OR GROUPS OF E.U.
MEMBER STATES HAVE BEEN VERY
INSENSITIVE TO SOME OF THE
CONCERNS OF THE ACCESSION
COUNTRIES.
WITH THE CANDIDATES, THERE ARE
ALSO I THINK, PROBLEMS AHEAD.
PARTICULARLY DEALING WITH
TURKEY.
THAT HAS BEEN AND WILL REMAIN A
FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE FOR THE
E.U., BUT I THINK ONCE AGAIN
IT'S IMPORTANT TO BE SENSITIVE
TO TURKISH CONCERNS AND ALSO TO
RECOGNIZE THAT TURKEY IS A VITAL
SECURITY PARTNER FOR THE
EUROPEAN UNION.
NATO LIKES TO POINT OUT THAT 13
OF 16 POTENTIAL FLASHPOINTS ARE
AROUND TURKEY, LITERAL.
SO YES, WE HAVE TO HAVE AN
ACTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THEM, AND
OBVIOUSLY OUR DIALOGUE WITH
RUSSIAN THROUGH THE COMMON
STRATEGY IS ALSO EXTREMELY
IMPORTANT.
SO I REMAIN, IF I CAN PUT IT
THIS WAY, OPTIMISTIC BUT CONCERNED.

The man in his sixties says
THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

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